The paper presented an identity based encryption (IBE) under selective opening attack (SOA) whose security is almost-tightly related to a set of computational assumptions. Our result is a combination of Bellare, Waters, and Yilek's method [TCC, 2011] for constructing (not tightly) SOA secure IBE and Hofheinz, Koch, and Striecks' technique [PKC, 2015] on building almost-tightly secure IBE in the multi-ciphertext setting. In particular, we first tuned Bellare et al.'s generic construction for SOA secure IBE to show that a one-bit IBE achieving ciphertext indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack in the multi-ciphertext setting (with one-sided publicly openability) tightly implies a multi-bit IBE secure under selective opening attack. Next, we almost-tightly reduced such a one-bit IBE to static assumptions in the composite-order bilinear groups employing the technique of Hofheinz et al. This yielded the first SOA secure IBE with almost-tight reduction.
Introduction

Background and Problem
formalized the notion of ciphertext indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) for identity based encryptions (IBE) and proposed the first practical solution in the random oracle model. Since then IND-CCA security and its weakened version, ciphertext indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA), have been accepted as standard security definitions for IBE. However stronger security guarantee is required in some application scenarios. In 2011, Bellare, Waters, and Yilek proposed the selective opening security (SOA) for IBE, which may act as the basis for discussing adaptively secure multi-party computation protocol [BWY11] .
Different from IND-CPA, the SOA security formalized in [BWY11] considers a communication system with multiple senders and multiple receivers. Besides eavesdropping all ciphertexts from communication channel, the adversary can also corrupt a subset of senders, extracting their plaintexts as well as random coins they used when generating corresponding ciphertexts. The SOA security ensures that ciphertexts sent by uncorrupted senders should not reveal any useful information on their corresponding plaintexts.
To construct an IBE achieving SOA security described above, Bellare et al. [BWY11] introduced a new primitive, IND-CPA one-bit IBE with one-sided publicly openability (1SPO), which is analogous to a weaker form of deniable public key encryption (PKE) [CDNO97] . Informally, the 1SPO property here requires that one can publicly recover the random coins used to encrypt message 1. They showed that a one-bit IBE with such a security guarantee can be generically transformed to a multi-bit IBE with SOA security in a quite straight way and provided two concrete constructions for such type of IBE based on Boyen and Waters's anonymous IBE [BW06] and De Caro, Iovino and Persiano's anonymous IBE [DCIP10] , which is further based on Lewko and Waters' IBE [LW10] employing the recently developed dual system technique [Wat09] . This results in two SOA secure IBE schemes based on decisional linear assumption and general subgroup decision assumption, respectively.
However both resulting constructions are not tight, the security loss is (k ) where k is the number of senders and is the length of each message in binary form. Namely the advantage of breaking the SOA security of these scheme is bounded by the advantage of solving some computational assumption times a factor (k ). This means that, in order to reach certain bit security, we have to use larger security parameters to compensate the security loss, which often leads to large group size and inefficient group operation. Therefore a tightly secure construction is desirable from both theoretical and practical points of view.
Our paper is devoted to develop an IBE scheme reaching SOA security in a tighter fashion. In particular, we give a SOA secure IBE almost-tightly reduced to several static assumptions using composite order bilinear groups. The "almost-tight" means the security loss is proportional to the security parameter λ and independent of k and . In general, we consider λ as a number far smaller than k .
Our Technique
Our work is motivated by the work of Hofheinz, Koch, and Striecks on almost-tight IBE in the multiinstance, multi-ciphertext setting [HKS15] . Roughly speaking, the so-called "ciphertext indistinguishability in the multi-instance, multi-ciphertext setting" ensures the confidentiality of multiple ciphertexts simultaneously. In the paper, we only consider a special case, i.e., the "single-instance, multi-ciphertext" setting (IND-mCPA). On the other hand, in the terms of Hofheinz et al., the one-bit IBE used in Bellare et al. ' s generic construction of SOA secure IBE is IND-CPA in the single instance, single ciphertext setting. Therefore a straight observation shows that, if we replace the one-bit IBE here with an IND-mCPA one-bit IBE also with 1SPO, this generic construction would become constantly tight. This result is quite obvious and is easy to demonstrate, we briefly present it in Section 3 to make the paper self-contained.
Having a tight generic transformation from IND-mCPA one-bit IBE to SOA secure multi-bit IBE, the remaining work is to build such a one-bit IBE whose security is almost-tightly related to some computational assumptions. Our solution is a combination of Bellare, Waters, and Yilek's second construction [BWY11] and Hofheinz, Koch, and Striecks' technique [HKS15] . Before explaining our solution, we first review these two basic work.
Dual System Technique. Both work follows the dual system technique invented by Waters [Wat09] . For an IBE scheme employing dual system technique, we define two forms for secret keys and ciphertexts, normal and semi-functional, which should be indistinguishable from each other. The normal keys and ciphertexts are used in the real system. We will say they are in the normal space. The semi-functional keys and ciphertexts will only be used in security proof and are always defined as normal keys and ciphertexts mixed with some additional components. We will call these components semi-functional components and say they are in the semi-functional space. Relying on certain algebraic feature, we can ensure the independence of normal space and semi-functional space in some sense, which allows us to make some changes (say, increasing entropy and breaking some algebraic structure) in the semi-functional space but avoid negative impact on the normal space, i.e., the real system. Bellare, Waters, and Yilek's Method. Bellare et al.'s idea [BWY11] is originated from the work on deniable encryption [CDNO97] . From a high level, they built a one-bit IBE with both IND-CPA and one-sided invertible sampleability (1SIS). An encryption of message 0 has some specific algebraic structure which is detectable for secret keys (of course, related to the same identity) but is pseudo-random from view of outsiders (adversaries); an encryption of message 1 is truly random and invertible samplable using just master public key.
Assume where U 14 , X 14 , W 14 ∈ p 1 p 4 , g 4 ∈ p 4 are parts of the master public key and s, t 4 , t 4 ∈ N are random coins for encryption. Since both encryption and master public key are independent in subgroup p 4 , the algebraic structure is hidden for the outsider, which can be proved following [DCIP10, LW10] . However the structure can be detected using the secret key in the form of and e(g 1 , h) α ∈ T are parts of the master public key, and s is the random coin for encryption, while secret keys are in the form of
where α ∈ N , h ∈ , h 123 ∈ p 1 p 2 p 3 , h w 123 ∈ p 1 p 2 p 3 are given in the master secret keys, and r ∈ N , R 4 , R 4 ∈ p 4 are random coins. Here subgroup p 1 again acts as the normal space, the semi-functional space consists of subgroup p 2 and p 3 . The last subgroup p 4 is now used to randomize keys.
We now briefly review the proof procedure. The proof begins with introducing p 2 -component into ciphertexts and conceptually inserting an random function R 0 mapping identity space to subgroup p 2 p 3 whose output is truly random but independent of the input as follows.
The next step is to gradually increase the dependence of R 0 's output on its input, from 0 bit to n bits. Here we need n computationally arguments and arise (n) security loss but unrelated to the number of secret keys or ciphertexts. Technically, each step relies on the orthogonality of subgroup p 2 and p 3 to independently adopt the proof technique introduced by Chen and Wee [CW13] in each of the two subgroups. Finally, we will reach the scenario with , since no additional entropy has been introduced in it during the proof. It is worth noting that Attrapadung et al. [AHY15] showed how to tightly obtain anonymity from a similar structure (using prime-order bilinear groups), i.e., the IND-mCPA in our setting. However they required the key generation procedure to be somewhat deterministic. Namely they use the same random coins for generating secret keys for the same identity. In our paper, we continue to work with the classical definition where each secret key is created from fresh random coins.
Our solution is to turn to the original version of Waters Hash [Wat05] where the encoding of identity ID is not linear but affine. In particular, we define an encryption for message 0 as where the newly introduced g u 1 ∈ p 1 is also published as a part of master public key after hidden by a random element of p 5 ; secret keys are defined as
where u is also introduced to maintain correctness. At this time, we can insert a random function relying on the entropy of u ∈ N and continue the proof procedure, which circumvents the issues in our first attempt. In particular, the first step of the proof now results in the following ciphertexts and secret keys respectively, which facilitates the proof of pseudo-randomness of the entire ciphertexts and circumvents the problem in our second attempt. We show the formal description of this construction and its security analysis in Section 4.
Related Work
Identity Based Encryption. The notion of identity based encryption was introduced by Shamir [Sha85] to alleviate the cost of key management in traditional PKI framework. The first practical solution with formal security analysis for this promising primitive was found by Boneh 
Roadmap
The remainder of our paper is organized in three parts. We first define some notations and review several concepts and security models in Section 2. Section 3 shows a generic construction from IND-mCPA one-bit IBE to SOA-secure multi-bit IBE with tight reduction. Such a one-bit IBE is presented in Section 4 followed by a series of static assumptions in composite-order bilinear groups. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
Preliminaries
Notations
We employ x := f ( y) to denote the process of assigning to x the result of f ( y) for some formula f (·) and some value y. For any positive number n, we define [n] := {1, . . . , n}. For any list or vector w, we let w[i] denote the ith entry of w. Similarly, for any binary string ID ∈ {0, 1} * , we use ID[i] to indicate the ith bit of ID. The notation y ← Alg(x 1 , . . . , x n ; r 1 , . . . , r m ) or Alg(x 1 , . . . , x n ; r 1 , . . . , r m ) → y refer to the process of running algorithm Alg with inputs x 1 , . . . , x n and random coins r 1 , . . . , r m , then assigning the result to variable y. The random coins may be omitted for brevity. We may also use a more compact form y ← Alg(x; r) where x := x 1 , . . . , x n and r := r 1 , . . . , r m . For any fixed input x, the set [Alg(x)] is defined as y : ∃r s.t. Alg(x; r) = y .
Given a finite cyclic group , we use X ← to denote the process of sampling a random element in . In particular, the notation is for the so-called "lazy sampling". Assuming g ∈ is a generator of group of order N , we sample X from by randomly sampling x from N and set X := g x . As [BWY11], we consider sampling random element from N (for any N ∈ >0 ) as the unique random source in our system, and denote this atomic process by x ← N . For any element g ∈ and list or vector w = (w 1 , . . . ,
. . , g n ) and h = (h 1 , . . . , h n ), two vectors over , we
Code-Based Games
As [BWY11], we employ code based games [BR06] for our security definitions and proofs. A code based game is defined by an Initialize procedure and a Finalize procedure plus a series of procedures, which will be used to answer adversary 's queries and depends on the security notion we concern. The game begins with running Initialize procedure and transmitting the result to adversary . During the game, is allowed to make various types of queries in any order. In general, is capable of making polynomial-many queries. Finally, is expected to return an output before it halts. The output of the game is then obtained by invoking Finalize procedure on 's output. As usual, we let Game (λ) = y denote the event that the output of executing Game with adversary on security parameter 1 λ is y.
Identity Based Encryptions
Algorithms. An identity-based encryption scheme with identity space IdSp and message space MsgSp consists of four (probabilistic) polynomial time algorithms defined as follows:
The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1 λ , and outputs a master public key MPK and the corresponding master secret key MSK.
-KeyGen(MPK, MSK, ID) → SK. The key generation algorithm takes as input a master public key MPK, a master secret key MSK and an identity ID ∈ IdSp, and outputs a secret key SK.
-Enc(MPK, ID, M) → CT. The encryption algorithm takes as input a master public key MPK, an identity ID ∈ IdSp and a message M ∈ MsgSp, outputs a ciphertext CT.
-Dec(MPK, SK, CT) → M. The decryption algorithm takes as input a master public key MPK, a secret key SK and a ciphertext CT, outputs a message M or a failure symbol ⊥.
Correctness. The correctness (with negligible failure probability) requires that, for all security parameter λ,
where ε is negligible in λ and the probability space is defined by random coins consumed by algorithm KeyGen and Enc.
More Notations. We now define two sets for an IBE scheme. We let Coins(MPK, M) be the set of random coins used to encrypt message M for all (MPK, MSK) ∈ [Setup(1
We also use Coins(MPK, ID, CT, M) to denote {r : CT = Enc(MPK, ID, M; r)}, the set of all random coins which makes algorithm Enc to produce CT as the ciphertext for message M under MPK and ID.
Security against Selective Opening Attacks
Bellare et al. [BWY11] formally defined selective opening security in the setting of IBE based on the work of [BHY09] . This subsection review their definition through two games: SOAREAL and SOASIM, defined in , and is any randomized algorithm with binary output. In both games, an adversary must make one NewMesg query before one Corrupt query.
Besides, game SOAREAL additionally allows the adversary to adaptively make polynomially-many Extract queries. 
Indistinguishability with One-sided Publicly Openability
The ciphertext indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack [BF01] (IND-CPA) is one of well-known security definitions for IBE. In the model, given master public key, an adversary is able to obtain polynomiallymany secret keys adaptively and a single challenge ciphertext for one of challenge messages, and is asked to guess a secret bit (which indicates which challenge message is used to generate challenge ciphertext). We consider IND-CPA in the multi-ciphertext setting (IND-mCPA) where the adversary now has access to polynomially-many challenge ciphertexts, which is recently proposed and investigated in more general multiinstance, multi-ciphertext setting [HKS15] . However the IND-mCPA alone is not sufficient for realizing SOA security. We require an additional property, called One-Sided Publicly Openability (1SPO), proposed by Bellare et al. [BWY11] based on the concept of deniable PKE [CDNO97] . Roughly speaking, 1SPO for an IBE with MsgSp = {0, 1} means that one can publicly open a ciphertext for message 1 by presenting its random coins. More formally, we review the following algorithm.
-OpenToOne(MPK, ID, CT) → r. The setup algorithm takes as input a master public key MPK, an identity ID ∈ IdSp and a ciphertext CT of 1, outputs a random coin r such that CT = Enc(MPK, ID, 1; r).
We allow algorithm OpenToOne to output failure symbol ⊥ with probability δ and require that, for all MPK ∈
[Setup(1
, and all r ∈ Coins(MPK, ID, CT, 1),
The algorithm is called δ-1SP opener and an IBE with a δ-1SP opener is called δ-one-sided publicly openable (δ-1SPO).
Tightly Reducing SOA Security to IND-CPA with δ-1SPO
Bellare et al. [BWY11] presented a trivial construction for -bit IBE IBE from one-bit IBE IBE, and proved that IBE achieves SOA security if the underlying IBE is IND-CPA with δ-1SPO. Their reduction has polynomial security loss. We review this trivial construction (with different identity space) and prove that IBE achieves SOA security if the underlying IBE is IND-mCPA with δ-1SPO. We emphasize that our reduction only has constant security loss.
Construction
Assume an one-bit IBE IBE = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec) with IdSp = {0, 1} n and MsgSp = {0, 1}. The -bit IBE IBE = Setup , KeyGen , Enc , Dec with IdSp = {0, 1} n (identical to IBE) and MsgSp = {0, 1} is defined as in Figure 4 .
return ct
It is quite clear that the correctness of the resulting IBE follows from the underlying one. More concretely, if IBE is correct with failure probability ε, IBE is correct with failure probability · ε.
Security Analysis
We want to prove the following theorem. 
The proof begins with constructing a SOA-simulator in SOASIM game, which takes any probabilistic polynomial time SOA-adversary as oracle. Our proof continues employing Bellare et al.'s construction and we recall it in Figure 5 . The SOA-simulator prepares a fresh master public/secret key pair (MPK, MSK) and initializes a SOA-adversary using MPK. To obtain 's output, answers all queries made by it, i.e., simulating SOAREAL game for . The Extract queries are directly answered using MSK. For the NewMesg query, SOA-simulator returns k encryptions of message 0 . In the figure, we use NewMesg to denote the NewMesg oracle for in SOASIM game, which returns nothing to . For the Corrupt query, opens corrupted messages correctly relying on the power of OpenToOne algorithm. In particular, if the corrupted message bit is 0, the random coin used when answering NewMesg query could be returned directly; if the bit is 1 instead, the random coin must be resampled so as to explain the corresponding ciphertext has given to , which is originally an encryption of 0, to be an encryption of 1. One may see that the simulation of is different from the specification of SOAREAL. Therefore the next step of the proof is to show that the simulation described in Figure 5 and the real SOAREAL are computationally indistinguishable from the viewpoint of . In detail, we employ hybrid argument using the game sequence shown in Figure 6 .
We have the following lemmas immediately.
Lemma 1 For any message sampler , any binary relation , any adversary ,
Lemma 2 For any message sampler , any binary relation , any adversary ,
Lemma 3 For any message sampler , any binary relation , any adversary ,
The first lemma follows from the fact that the algorithm OpenToOne is not perfect, its failure probability is δ, and there are at most k applications of OpenToOne. For the second lemma, since we can answer NewMesg queries without knowing anything about m, it is safe to defer the sampling of m. The last lemma follows the observation that the SOA-simulator described in Figure 5 is able to simulate Game 3 and 's output always equals 's.
To finish the proof of the theorem, we must fill the gap between Game 1 and Game 2 . Especially, we prove the following lemma. Proof. Given MPK and oracle access to Extract and Challenge, algorithm proceeds as follows:
Initialize Return MPK. 1], both and T are cyclic groups of order N , and e : × → T is an admissible bilinear map. We let and T also contain their generators, denoted by g ∈ and g T ∈ T , respectively. We define public group description = N , , T , e and take factoring of N , i.e., p 1 , . . . , p 5 , as secret information. It is the secret information that allow us to derive the generator of each subgroup from the generator of the entire group, i.e., g ∈ , and sample random element from it.
Extract(ID) Return Extract (ID).
NewMesg(id,
For positive integer N with N |N , we use N to indicate the unique subgroup of order N . Given g ∈ n and h ∈ m such that gcd(n, m) = 1, we have e (g, h) 
Assumption 2 For any probabilistic polynomial time adversary , the advantage function defined as follows are negligible in λ.
Adv
Assumption 3 For any probabilistic polynomial time adversary , the advantage function defined as follows are negligible in λ.
Adv 
Assumption 6 For any probabilistic polynomial time adversary , the advantage function defined as follows are negligible in λ.
To realize the One-sided Publicly Openability, we need to be equipped with publicly reversible sampling [BWY11, FHKW10, LDL + 14]. Formally, there exist two algorithms defined as follows.
-Sample () → G. The publicly reversible sampler takes no input and outputs a random element from group with probability 1 − ζ or outputs a failure symbol ⊥ with probability ζ. In particular, for all G ∈ , we require that
where the probability space is defined by random coins consumed by Sample .
-Sample −1 (G) → r. The public re-sampler takes an element G ∈ as input and outputs random coins r with probability 1 − θ such that Sample (; r) = G or outputs a failure symbol ⊥ with probability θ . In particular, we require that, for all r ∈ R G where R G := r : Sample (; r) = G ,
where the probability space is defined by random coins consumed by Sample −1 .
Bellare, Waters, and Yilek [BWY11] had realized these two algorithms for bilinear group with ζ ≈ 1/2 ρ and θ ≈ 1/2 ρ where ρ is an independent parameter, based on the technique for hashing into elliptic curve groups [BLS01] . We will invoke Sample and Sample −1 as black box, their detailed specifications can be found in [BWY11] . K 
Construction
Assuming a group generator GrpGen described in previous subsection, our main construction is shown in Figure 7 , an IBE scheme with identity space IdSp = {0, 1} n and message space MsgSp = {0, 1} which is also equipped with algorithm OpenToOne for achieving One-Sided Publicly Openability.
The correctness of our construction is obvious. Fix an ID ∈ IdSp. As [BWY11] , algorithm OpenToOne indeed satisfies our requirement defined in Section 2 by the property of algorithm Sample and Sample −1 shown in previous subsection. We remark that algorithm OpenToOne runs Sample −1 twice independently and thus has failure probability δ 2θ .
Security Analysis
We prove the following theorem in this subsection. 
and max i∈ [6] 
where poly is independent of .
Organization of Proof
Before we proceed, we define two functions for brevity:
(1)
N , U ∈ , and W ∈ 2n . When we set U = g u and W = g w for some g ∈ , we immediately have the following relation
We also need a family of random functions R i (·) i∈{0}∪[n] defined as follows:
where ID| i denotes the i-bit prefix of ID. We note that the Chinese Reminder Theorem implies that R i (ID) mod p 2 and R i (ID) mod p 3 are distributed independently, which correspond to R i and R i , respectively, in [HKS15] . Although the range of random functions is N , the actual working range is R i (ID) mod p 2 and R i (ID) mod p 3 corresponding to semi-functional space p 2 and p 3 , respectively. The proof follows hybrid arguments using a series of games, which can be roughly divided into four phases. We describe these games in a phase-by-phase fashion in Figure 8, Figure 9 , Figure 10, Figure 11 , respectively. In particular, we state that -In phase 1, we introduce semi-functional components (elements in p 2 ) into ciphertexts and introduce random function R 0 into the system.
-In phase 2, we increase the entropy of random function we have introduced following the method of Hofheinz et al. [HKS15] . In particular, by executing phase 2 for n times, we replace the initial random function R 0 with R n , whose output depends on all bits of ID.
-In phase 3, we handle the multiple occurrences of a single identity in challenge ciphertexts as well as in secret keys. We finally argue that multiple ciphertexts for a single identity are computationally independent in semi-functional space and so do secret keys. The proof will also follows Hofheinz et al.'s idea for full security [HKS15] .
-In phase 4, we show that all ciphertexts for M = 0 are computationally indistinguishable from those for M = 1, which is truly random following the method used in [DCIP10, BWY11] .
The remaining of the section includes four parts corresponding to four phases in order. Each part begins with games involved and then proves a series of lemmas showing computational indistinguishability of these games. Putting them together, we immediately obtain the main theorem. In the proof, we define the advantage function of adversary
Phase 1: Prelude
All games used in Phase 1 is defined in Figure 8 . U Proof. Given , g 1 , g 4 , g 5 , X 1 X 2 X 3 , T where T is a random element of either p 1 or p 1 p 2 , adversary simulates the procedures as follows. We assume g 2 ← p 2 , g 3 ← p 3 and implicitly parse X 1 X 2 X 3 = g 1 g 2 g 3 x for some x ∈ N , and either T = g t 1 or T = g 1 g 2 t from some t ∈ N . 
Lemma 5 (Game
:= g 1 g 2 g 3 u ; W := g 1 g 2 g 3 w β ← {0, 1} return , G, U, W, g 5 Extract(ID) if ID ∈ ChID then return ⊥ ExID := ExID ∪ {ID} r, r 4 , r 4 ← N K := G r g r 4 4 K := H( U, W, ID) r g r 4 4 K := g 2 g 3 R 0 (ID)·r · H( U, W, ID) r g r 4 4 return K, K Game 0 , Game 1 , Game 2.0 R 0 : IdSp → N Challenge(ID * , M * 0 , M * 1 ) if ID * ∈ ExID then return ⊥ ChID := ChID ∪ {ID * } if M * β = 0 then s, s 5 , s 5 ← N C := H(U, W, ID) s g s 5 5 C := H( U, W, ID) s g s 5 5 C := g R 0 (ID * )·s 2 · H( U, W, ID) s g s 5 5 C := G s g s 5 5 C := G s g s 5 5 else C, C ← Sample () return C, C Finalize(β ) return (β = β )
Initialize
Extract(ID)
Return ⊥ when ID ∈ ChID. Update ExID := ExID ∪ {ID}. Sample r , r 4 , r 4 ← N and set
4 .
Output K, K . Here we implicitly set r := x r ∈ N . 
Challenge(ID
* , M * 0 , M * 1 ) Return ⊥ when ID * ∈ ExID. Update ChID := ChID ∪ {ID * }. If M * β = 0,
Finalize(β ) Output (β = β ).
The algorithm outputs 1 if and only if Finalize(β ) = 1, i.e., the adversary wins the game. Observe that if T = g t 1 ∈ p 1 , the simulation described above is identical to Game 0 ; if T = g 1 g 2 t ∈ p 1 p 2 , the simulation is identical to Game 1 . Therefore we can conclude that Adv 0 (λ) − Adv and U := g 1 g 2 g 3 u g 2 g 3 R 0 , the resulting game remains unchanged, since we in fact implicitly define u = u mod p 1 and u = u + R 0 mod p 2 p 3 , which is still distributed over N as we required in Game 1 . Observe that the simulation is also identical to Game 2.0 with u = u except the definition of U and U in Initialize procedure. However we note that the difference is just conceptual as both U and U are not given to adversary in MPK. Therefore we can conclude that Game 1 and Game 2.0 are statistically identical.
Lemma 6 (Game
Phase 2:
From R 0 to R n All games used in Phase 2 is defined in Figure 9 .
elif M * β = 0 and ID 
where T is a random element of either p 2 p 5 or p 3 p 5 , adversary simulates the procedures as follows. We assume g 2 ← p 2 , g 3 ← p 3 and implicitly parse X 2 X 5 = g 2 g 5
x for some x ∈ N , Y 2 Y 3 = g 2 g 3 y for some y ∈ N and either T = g 2 g 5 t or T = g 3 g 5 t for some t ∈ N . Output K, K . Here we implicitly set r ∈ N such that r = r mod p 1 and r = y r mod p 2 p 3 . .
Initialize
Challenge(ID
Here we implicitly set s ∈ N such that s = s mod p 1 , and s = ts mod p 2 p 3 . Finally, if M *
The algorithm outputs 1 if and only if Finalize(β ) = 1, i.e., the adversary wins the game. Observe that if T = g 2 g 5 t ∈ p 2 p 5 , the simulation described above is identical to Game 2.i ; if T = g 3 g 5 t , the simulation is identical to Game 2.i.1 . Therefore we can conclude that Adv 2.i (λ) − Adv 
where X 4, j , X 4, j ← p 4 and T j is either g 
Extract(ID)
Return ⊥ when ID ∈ ChID. Update ExID := ExID ∪ {ID}. If R i (ID) has not been used before, sample r , r 4 , r 4 ← N and set 
where index j ∈ [q] and index r ∈ N were selected at the first time R i (ID) was met in the simulation. 
Proof. The proof is almost the same as the proof for Lemma 7. The only difference is to employ the highentropy random function R i+1 instead of the low-entroy R i in the simulation.
Phase 3: Handling multi-ciphertexts, multi-keys setting
All games used in Phase 3 is defined in Figure 10 . , adversary generates Q C tuples (using Many Tuple Lemma [CW13] )
where X 5, j ← p 5 and T j is either g Output K, K . 
Challenge(ID
.
Here we implicitly set s ∈ N such that s = s mod p 1 , s = x j mod p 2 and R n (ID * ) = y · R (ID * ) mod p 2 for ID * ∈ ChID. We note that the assignment for R n is always consistent since the simulation ensures that
The algorithm outputs 1 if and only if Finalize(β ) = 1, i.e., the adversary wins the game. Observe that if T j = g x j y 2 for all j ∈ [q], the simulation described above is identical to Game 2.n . On the other hand, if T j = g x j y+z j 2 for all j ∈ [q], the simulation is identical to Game 3 where we implicitly set s = R (ID) · (x j y + z j ). Therefore we can conclude that Adv 2.n (λ) − Adv where Y 4 , X 4, j ← p 4 and T j is either g 2 g 3 x j y or g 2 g 3 x j y+z j for x j , z j ← N , and then simulates the procedures as follows. Here we implicitly set r ∈ N such that r = r mod p 1 , r = x j mod p 2 p 3 and define R n (ID) = y · R (ID) mod p 2 p 3 for ID ∈ ExID. We note that the assignment for R n is consistent since ExID ∩ ChID = . Proof. The transformation from Game 4 to Game 5 is just conceptual following the Chinese Remainder Theorem. In both games, the p 2 p 3 -parts of K and K are independent, and so do the p 2 -part of C and C . Of course, the p 1 -parts of them are still structural.
Initialize
Challenge(ID
Phase 4: Epilogue
All games used in Phase 4 is defined in Figure 11 . If M * β = 1, sample C, C ← Sample (). Output C, C .
Finalize(β ) Output (β = β ).
The algorithm outputs 1 if and only if Finalize(β ) = 1, i.e., the adversary wins game. Observe that if T = g 1 g 2 g 5 t ∈ p 1 p 2 p 5 , the simulation described above is identical to Game 6 ; if T = g t , the simulation is identical to Game 7 . Therefore we can conclude that Adv 6 (λ) − Adv
Lemma 15 (Game 7 ≈ Game Fin ) For adversary , Adv 7 (λ) − Adv
Fin (λ) 2ζ.
Proof. These two games are exactly the same until publicly reversible sampler Sample outputs ⊥ when encrypting message 0 in Game Fin . Clearly we can bound the probability of this event by 2ζ where ζ is the error probability of Sample . Therefore we can conclude that Adv 7 (λ) − Adv
Final Analysis. In the last game Game Fin , ciphertexts for message 0 and 1 are produced following the same procedure, i.e., invoking Sample () twice. Therefore we have Adv
Fin (λ) = 0 for any adversary . Combining all lemmas above together, we have proved the main theorem.
Conclusion
The paper proposed the first identity based encryption scheme secure against selective opening attack with almost-tight security reduction. The work applied Hofheinz et al.'s recent technique for almost-tight secure IBE in the multi-ciphertext setting to Bellare et al.'s framework for reaching selective opening security from standard IND-CPA security in the IBE setting. The resulting construction works with bilinear groups whose order is the product of five distinct prime numbers.
